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Introduction 
 “Prepare for the unknown by studying how others in the past have coped with the 
unforeseeable and the unpredictable.” What does a General George Patton quote 
have to do with cyber and physical threats or the Internet of Everything?  
After over 40 years of the Internet faithfully serving the needs of the Earth’s 
human population for information, communication and entertainment, we are 
now in the era of the Internet of Things. And of course, when we refer to the 
Internet, we also mean the Web and therefore the Web of Things, where 
distributed applications benefitting from networking through the Internet are no 
longer a privilege of humans. Things can also take full advantage of the capabilities, 
simplicity and potential of Web technologies and protocols. Following current 
developments in this field, it is not difficult to see the inevitability of the 
convergence of the two worlds, of humans and of things, each using the Internet 
as a primary means of communication. Possibly the most appropriate term to 
describe this evolution has been proposed by CISCO: The Internet of Everything 
(IoE) “brings together people, process, data, and things to make networked 
connections more relevant and valuable than ever before”. In the IoE era, machines 
are equal as Internet users. 
In an ecosystem where everything is connected, and where physical and cyber 
converge and collaborate, the threats of the two worlds not only coexist, but also 
converge, creating a still largely unknown environment, where an attack in cyber 
space can propagate and have an adverse effect in physical space and vice versa. 
So how can we be prepared and confront this new unknown? How can we study 
and learn from the ways this has been dealt with in the past? First, it is important 
to simplify the problem, by attempting to identify the components of IoE and the 
threats and effects an attack can have in each one. 
Composing the Internet of Everything and decomposing it to its threats 
Let us take the thread of IoE evolution and follow it back to its origin, identifying 
its composing elements and corresponding threats in terms of attack impact and 
means to achieve it. We will not use the standard computer network practice for 
visualizing a layered hierarchical structure, as the one found in OSI or TCP/IP 
layers, but will structure the components based on their physical or virtual 
representation, with the cyber world built on top of the physical. According to this, 
we can identify four different layers of components for IoE: 
1. The lower layer corresponds to the “everything” of the IoE, including 
humans and things (namely sensors, actuators and embedded systems 
which combine them). This is the basis of the physical part of our 
representation, including all communicating members in the IoE 
ecosystem. The impact of a possible attack here can directly affect humans 
or things by causing an adverse physical effect to humans or operation of 
devices that does not comply with their specification or their users’ 
intentions. This may require special hardware and equipment that can 
affect the operation of machines, and through them can affect the physical 
privacy, the convenience or, in extreme cases, the health of human beings 
(e.g., as a result of a physical explosion in the context of the Industrial 
Internet or a malfunctioning life support medical device). 
2. The physical world representation is completed by the 
telecommunications equipment. In a connected world, we tend to take the 
telecommunications infrastructure for granted, focusing only on issues of 
protocols and applications. Even though an attack at this level would 
require considerable access to resources, the results could be catastrophic, 
as the clear impact of such an attack (disabling or overriding 
communications) is to render all the communication infrastructure 
incapable of operation in its intended way (or even completely disable it). 
The way to achieve it is through special hardware, which is able to either 
operate in a non-standard way (i.e. for overriding communications), or 
damage communication equipment (i.e. signal jammers, frequency 
transmitters). 
3. From the Physical part of the IoE pyramid, we now move up to the Cyber 
part, the lower layer of which consists of the communication protocols. 
This part is probably the most familiar to communication engineers, as 
attacks here target the transport of data, in order to intercept them, modify 
them or prevent them from reaching their intended destination, or simply 
to generate illegitimate traffic. As this is the most widely studied layer, 
there are several means and tools to achieve any kind of mischief in this 
space, for example with protocol sniffers and analyzers, packet generators 
etc. 
4. The top layer is the most recently introduced, but also the one that is 
evolving the most quickly: The Web of Things. Here, the attacks no longer 
target the communication between IoE entities, but the actual purpose for 
communication, focusing on the information/data and control. Depending 
on the target, standard hacking tools and social engineering can be used. 
 
 
 
Based on these four layers, by cyber security breaches, we refer to attacks that 
target the IoE at the level of the protocols and the web of things, while by physical 
security breaches, we refer to those attacks that target the telecommunication and 
sensing infrastructures.  The following is a brief overview of security threats that 
correspond to each of the four layers. 
Cyber: Web of Things 
As in the case of the world wide web, the attacks here may have little to do with 
the communication, or even computing infrastructure. The virtualization offered 
by the web, where traditional services have been substituted by their “e-
quivalent”, has opened a new world of cyber rather than physical threats. Instead 
of someone capturing something tangible and asking ransom for it, a ransomware 
can block access to an electronic asset or service and ask for ransom in an 
automated manner. In the case of devices and things being part of the web of 
things, the situation can get even worse: Seizing access to critical infrastructure 
could lead to serious hazards affecting public health or other key public sector 
services. With electronic devices controlling practically every critical 
infrastructure, from power grid to telecommunications, and even elections, 
protecting the connected things over the web from cyber attacks is critical. 
Cyber: Protocols 
In order to enable the communication between Things in IoE, different protocols 
governing communication at all layers of the communication stack need to be 
deployed, each presenting different challenges in terms of security. Though the 
risks and impact are well known (interception of communications, alteration of 
transmitted data, spoofing of information), the tools and means that attackers can 
achieve them differ. As new protocols appear, new threats (in the form of old ones 
appearing under a new suit) arise, and countermeasures have to be re-invented. 
Unfortunately, there is no recipe for success here, as the experience from the past 
is only to the advantage of the attackers. After all, you have to know the threat 
before you can confront it. 
Physical: Telecommunications 
As Telecom operators are rapidly “embracing the cloud“ in order to improve their 
efficiency in operations, services rollout and content storage and distribution, a 
new challenge is emerging: the need for Cloud security, for which security 
strategies seem to be in place for only 50% of telecom companies [Radware2016]. 
To add to this, the emerging trend for “Shadow IT” (use of IT systems within an 
organization without the involvement of corporate IT) intensifies security and 
privacy risks, adding to the traditional challenge of uninterruptable service 
provision, that of personal data protection. 
Physical: Sensing 
Depending on the type of sensing technology used, a capable adversary with 
physical access may attempt to deceive the sensor used [Loukas2015]. For 
instance, some infrared sensors are known to have difficulty in detecting objects 
hiding behind window glass. Wearing a costume made of foam or other material 
that absorbs sound waves can theoretically defeat ultrasonic motion sensors. Full-
body scanners based on backscatter X-ray imaging technology might fail to detect 
a pancake-shaped plastic device with beveled edges taped to the abdomen, a fire-
arm affixed to the outside of the leg and scanned against a dark background etc. 
These techniques for deceiving sensors used by physical security systems have 
been proven experimentally and documented publicly by researchers. 
 
One particularly impressive such experimental attack that has been recently 
published aims to defeat lidar by producing an overwhelming number of spoofed 
echoes or objects (Petit2015). This could be loosely characterised as a sensory 
channel denial of service attack. A simpler but not less effective attack on cameras 
has been demonstrated by the same authors. By emitting light into a camera  (e.g., 
with a laser pointer), it is possible to blind it by rendering it unable to tune auto 
exposure or gain, effectively hiding objects from its view. 
 
Another interesting example is the use of sound-based attacks that aim to impede 
the ability of drones to maintain themselves in an upright position. The approach 
described by Son et al. (Son2015) works by generating a sound at a frequency 
close to the resonant frequency of a drone’s micro-electro-mechanical-system 
gyroscope. If the gyroscope’s resonant frequency is within the audible range , as is 
the case for several types used in commercial drones, the sound causes resonance. 
This increases severely the standard deviation of the gyroscope’s output and 
consequently incapacitates the drone. The civilian drone used in their 
experiments crashed shortly after the attack every time. 
An overarching threat: Deception 
Traditionally, the attack avenue that has overcome most technical security 
measures put in place is deception. In computer security, the term used is 
semantic attack, which is “the manipulation of user-computer interfacing with the 
purpose to breach a computer system’s information security through user 
deception” [Heartfield2016]. Although not as precise, an umbrella term that is 
commonly used for both technical and non-technical such deception attacks is 
social engineering. It can range from email phishing and infected website adverts 
to fraudulent Wi-Fi hotspots and USB devices with misleading labels, all of which 
aim to lure the human users into disclosing private data, such as their password, 
or performing some compromising action like downloading malware. The great 
strength of deception-based attacks is that technology security measures can be 
rendered irrelevant. For instance, it does not matter whether the user has 
installed strong firewalls and antivirus systems in their home network if they 
themselves are fooled into downloading malware on the smartphone that they 
have linked to all their smart home devices. 
  
To an extent, the concept can be extended to physical threats. Examples would 
include most sensory channel attacks described in the previous section, as their 
aim is to deceive in this case a sensor (rather than a user). Sensor-based systems 
are designed and operate with the assumption that they can trust that their 
sensors have an honest (even if inaccurate) representation of their physical 
environment. Sensory channel attacks ensure that this is not the case. 
Use cases  
To illustrate the extent and breadth of cyber and physical threats to the IoE, we 
have chosen to focus on the aspects that directly and comprehensively affect a 
citizen’s actual safety and perception of safety. In this direction, we discuss the 
brief history, current state and future of physical and cyber threats to 
automobility, the domotic environment and well-being. For each one, we 
investigate whether General Patton’s approach to turn to  (safety and security) 
history for solutions would help. 
 
Automobility 
 
Over the past seven years, attacks on cars have become a highlight in pretty much 
every high-profile security conference. It would not be an exaggeration to observe 
that there is such a thing as automotive cyber fatigue, with articles on different 
models of cars hacked being on the news every week. In fact, it is seen as so 
obvious that citizen’s private cars will start becoming targets of cyber attacks that 
researchers have already started studying the impact that future cyber security 
warnings will have on the drivers [Altschaffel2015]. Will the drivers interpret the 
warnings correctly? Will they be affected psychologically, and would that by itself 
compromise their safety? This is a concern in IoE in general. It is accentuated in 
the automotive sector because of the imminent danger to drivers and passengers 
posed by a mere distraction from a security warning, let alone by an extensive 
security breach affecting the engine or brakes. 
 
But surely, this is not the first time the automotive industry deals with driver 
distractions from warnings. The EU, USA and several countries have developed 
rigorous guidelines for the provision of information to drivers in a manner that 
reduces distraction to the driver by taking into account single glance duration, 
amount and priority of information, etc. A recommended worldwide distraction 
guideline policy position has been provided by the International Organization of 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers in 2015 and can be adopted by engineers developing 
mechanisms and content for in-car cyber security warnings too. It is also not the 
first time the automotive security sector deals with command injection attacks 
that render critical systems unavailable. For example, large-scale EU-funded 
projects, such as FP7 EVITA, have provided practical solutions for securing the 
communication and embedded computation of modern cars since the previous 
decade, long before cyber security of cars reached mainstream media. The 
increased vulnerability of modern cars to cyber-physical threats due to the variety 
of communication, automation and telematics technologies introduced lately can 
be addressed with existing security mechanisms, as long as the buyer is willing to 
pay for it. So, it is more a matter of price elasticity than of availability of cyber 
protection solutions for cars. 
 
Currently, sensory channel attacks can be considered as too exotic to be a 
significant concern. This is expected to gradually change as automation and 
reliance on sensing increases, especially in the automotive sector. A prime 
example is the driverless car, which is expected to become a commercial reality in 
the next decade. As driverless cars depend heavily on lidar, a low-cost device that 
would generate volumes of misleading fake objects would render them completely 
unable to operate. A very intelligent type of attack without doubt, but from the 
perspective of automotive safety, the end result is an unreliable or unavailable 
sensor. If one ignores for a moment the malicious intent, this is one more case of 
a sensor reliability problem, which has been addressed in great detail by 
mathematicians, computer scientists, physicists and engineers over several 
decades. After all, a car’s sensor is much more common to fail naturally, given the 
adverse environment where it operates rather than as a result of a sensory 
channel attack. So, redundancy (using more than one sensor for the same data 
collection, often supported by an algorithm for estimating a sensor’s predicted 
measurements) and diversity (using more than one types of sensors for the same 
problem and cross-correlating their data) are natural solutions for cyber-physical 
resilience too. 
 
Domotic Environment 
Most smart home devices are small and inexpensive. They often have to offload 
their processing and storage to a cloud environment and rely on the home router 
for security, unable to feature any sophisticated onboard protection mechanism. 
At a real-world commercial level, security is usually limited to a simple 
authentication mechanism, usually a password, which is commonly left to its 
factory default, and HTTPS encryption of network traffic. Guessing or stealing the 
password via commonplace social engineering semantic attacks or compromising 
any of the control interfaces of the smart home, such as the owner’ s smartphone 
or a corresponding cloud-based interface is sufficient to take full control of its 
devices.  In practice, it has been argued that a typical smart home’s only real 
protection is the fact that NAS prevents individual devices from being directly 
visible on the Internet and that the number of devices globally is still not large 
enough to justify economically the focus of organised cyber criminals. This is 
rapidly changing. According to Gartner, it is estimated that by 2022, a typical 
smart home will include around 500 Internet-connected devices [Gartner2014]. 
 
Yet, the reality is that almost all actual cyber security breaches publicly reported 
in this context have involved no extraordinary effort or advanced hacking 
technique and would have been prevented if common sense and age-old security 
design principles, such as those proposed by Saltzer and Schroeder in the 1970s, 
had been followed. The real problem is that embedded system developers simply 
do not know them. In fact, these principles (as well as other relevant disciplines, 
such as wireless networks and cloud computing) are often omitted from the 
curricula of software engineering Bachelor degrees. Take, for instance, the 
principle of the least common mechanism. Companies that develop cameras for 
home automation systems tend to re-use their code for multiple versions and 
multiple models, but assumptions originally made about their use may no longer 
be valid as more features are added, leading to libraries with excess features and 
security holes. Similarly, the principles of the economy of mechanism and 
minimization of attack surface are commonly violated by smart lock developers. 
For example, in a home with multiple door entrances (e.g., a main one with a 
smartlock and a conventional one from the garage), a user may accidentally unlock 
more doors than the one it used when returning home. That is because of the 
(possibly excessive) auto-unlock feature, which unlocks a door when the user is 
returning home and is within 10 m (for Bluetooth low energy) from the door. 
However, the assumption that just because a user is near a door means that the 
user intends to unlock it does not hold. Similar examples of violation of the basic 
security design principles can be found behind most security failures in domotic 
environments. Making sure that they are included in software developers’ 
education and expected by standardization bodies would be sufficient to prevent 
the vast majority of security breaches without needing to develop new security 
technologies. 
 
Well-being and healthcare 
The episode of TV drama Homeland where terrorists assassinated a senator by 
tampering with his pacemaker (accelerating his heartbeat) was seen by many as 
far-fetched, but it was a scenario that former US Vice President Dick Cheney had 
considered realistic before asking his doctors to disable his pacemaker’s wireless 
functionality as early as in 2007 [Clery2015]. This was long before “connected 
healthcare” and today’s numerous options of available wearable devices. In fact, 
the term “wearable” falls already too short in describing the variety of devices 
capable of monitoring and wirelessly reporting on wellbeing and personal health 
status: If we were to correctly identify all options, then we should also add 
implantable, adhesive, patched and even ingestible devices. For the latter, the US 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has recently declined to approve the first 
mass market drug incorporating an ingestible sensor (a collaboration between 
Proteus and Otsuka Pharmaceuticals) on the basis of request for more tests and 
"data regarding the performance of the product under the conditions in which it 
is likely to be used, and further human factors investigations" 
[MobileHealthNews2016]. 
It is inevitable that personalized, daily monitoring of our health conditions and 
wellbeing will be carried out through the use of one or more devices, while it is 
also a matter of time and culture to widely accept a more active role of these 
devices: Insulin pumps, drug infusion pumps, pacemakers with integrated 
defibrillators. FDA has already acknowledged the criticality of the situation, 
issuing recommendations on how manufacturers should safeguard medical 
devices against cyber breaches, making security by design a top priority. 
In terms of safety-criticality, there is a distinction between devices which are 
related to health issues (i.e. a blood pressure monitor device and or app) and these 
which relate to wellbeing (i.e. calories calculators or apps which can help you cut 
smoking), but this is debatable. Imagine your bedside device, programmed to lull 
you to sleep through the gentle sound of waves and wake you up at the right time 
(based on your sleep cycle) at the sweet sound of a nightingale. It does not take 
more than compromising your IFTTT account to change the settings so that at 3.00 
AM you wake up to an AC/DC power riff intro. Or compromising your training app 
and making it push you to speed up for the last mile on your jogging run, instead 
of stopping you based on your (increased beyond normal) heart rate readings. If 
you are in good health, these would simply be a nuisance, but for a person with a 
heart condition, they could be life threatening incidents. 
 
So, where in security practice do we turn for inspiration when it comes to 
protecting our well-being and health from cyber attacks? Suitably, it is probably 
more about hygiene (that is, cyber hygiene) than anything else. Medical devices in 
hospitals are notorious for relying on very old operating systems (such as 
Windows XP in network-connected MRI machines) that have long been 
discontinued in every other industry and are no longer supported officially. It is 
not that demanding expecting medical software developers to provide updates in 
the same way the rest of the IT industry operates. But would hospitals install 
updates? Introduction of cyber hygiene training would be the minimum 
requirement for such a culture shift. It would also help if medical personnel 
refrained from leaving post-it notes with their shared account’s password on 
hospital computers. Then, there is privacy in wearables, which is commonly based 
on proprietary/secret cryptography methods, so as to tick that box, but close 
cryptography is never as robust as open cryptography, because it has not been 
subjected to the same level of scrutiny. It is a key principle in cryptography, set by 
Auguste Kerkhoff in the 1880s, that a cryptographic system “must not be required 
to be secret, and it must be able to fall into the hands of the enemy without 
inconvenience”. Once again, following cyber hygiene and age-old security 
principles should be sufficient to thwart most realistic cyber-physical threats. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Security is about protecting from realistic threats that require realistic effort. 
Protecting against extraordinary threats that require extraordinary effort has 
never been a goal in this sector, because it would simply never be practical. The 
advent of the IoT, and soon the IoE, has undoubtedly expanded the attack surface 
and the range of our daily life activities that are affected. By supporting devices 
rather than being supported by devices, the Internet of Everything may be much 
larger than the Internet we have been used to, but it is still the Internet. If we have 
been able to produce trustworthy communication over basic communication 
infrastructure and network protocols designed in the 1970s, there is little 
fundamentally new in terms of emerging threats in the IoE. It is still about 
protecting systems and networks by following security principles that have 
withstood the test of time, whether these are the original principles by Saltzer and 
Schroeder, modern cyber security hygiene practices, or mere common sense, 
preferably cultivated through security education for software developers  and 
awareness programs for users. 
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